Abstract-Trade costs are often additive. Well-known examples are quotas, per unit tariffs, and, in part, transportation costs. In spite of this, we have no broad and systematic evidence of the magnitude of these costs. In this paper, we develop a new empirical framework for estimating additive trade costs from standard firm-level trade data. Our results suggest that additive barriers are on average 14%, expressed relative to the median price. The point estimates are strongly correlated with common proxies for trade costs. Using our microestimates, we show that an additive import tariff reduces welfare and trade by more than an equal-yield multiplicative tariff.
I. Introduction
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1 Multiplicative costs are defined as a constant percentage of the producer price per unit traded, while additive costs are defined as a constant cost per unit traded (conditional on a product). We use the terminology additive costs throughout the paper. Per unit and specific trade costs are also terms frequently used in the literature. 2 For example, according to UPS rates at the time of writing, a fee of $125 is charged for shipping a two-pound package from Oslo to New York (UPS Worldwide Saver), with an additional 0.85% of the declared value for full insurance. The fee per pound varies according to origin and destination; the insurance charge is independent of origin and destination. price), also can act as additive trade costs. 3 Third, distribution costs are also partly additive costs (e.g., Corsetti & Dedola, 2005) .
Although we can directly observe the magnitude of additive trade costs in some specific cases (e.g., for a freight company or in a country's tariff schedule), we have no broad and systematic evidence of the magnitude of additive trade costs in international trade. The first contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. We present a general framework to structurally estimate the magnitude of additive trade costs using firm-level trade data. Our methodology exploits a robust theoretical mechanism that shapes the association between producer prices and demand in the presence of additive costs. Specifically, higher additive trade costs are associated with a less negative demand elasticity, especially among low-price firms. This result holds for a wide range of utility functions. Our identification strategy resembles a triple differences approach and is robust to endogeneity concerns, as well as quality heterogeneity and nonconstant demand elasticities within narrowly defined products (see section IVC).
Using Norwegian firm-level trade data, we estimate trade costs for a large number of countries and products. Several strong results emerge from the empirical analysis. On average, additive trade costs are 14% of the (median) price. Our estimates are strongly positively correlated with observable proxies of trade costs, such as distance and product weight per value. We emphasize that our methodology can only identify additive trade costs relative to multiplicative costs, meaning that our estimates are a lower bound of the true value of additive costs. 4 The second contribution of this paper is to show that the presence of additive trade costs has important implications. First, we show that an additive import tariff reduces welfare by more than an equal-yield multiplicative tariff, that is, a multiplicative tariff that generates the same total tariff revenue. In the presence of heterogeneity in prices, an additive trade barrier distorts the relative price of two varieties of a good both within and across markets. As a consequence, and as Alchian and Allen (1964) showed, additive costs alter relative consumption patterns both within and across markets. Multiplicative barriers distort prices only 778 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS across markets. 5 Empirical findings of the gains from trade (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002, and Feyrer, 2009 ) are often large compared to the relatively modest gains predicted by the class of models considered by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) . Hence, this paper contributes to reconciling the empirical and theoretical evidence. Second, the additive tariff also reduces trade by more than the equal-yield multiplicative tariff. This result suggests that inferring (iceberg) trade costs from trade flows using gravity models, as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , may overstate trade barriers. It is well known that standard models have difficulties matching the growth in global trade over time (Yi, 2003) ; our results suggest that additive trade costs may play an important role.
Third, standard trade models (Melitz, 2003) can predict zero bilateral trade flows between any country pair only once fixed costs on the supply side are assumed in combination with a particular upper bound on productivity, as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) , or after assuming a finite integer number of firms, as in Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012) . Our model offers a natural way to reconcile empirics and theory without assuming arbitrary bounds on productivity or abandoning the continuum assumption. Since the presence of additive trade costs means that firm sales are always bounded, then even the most productive firm may not find it profitable to enter the export market.
More flexible modeling of trade costs is not new in international economics. Alchian and Allen (1964) pointed out that relative demand for the high-quality good increases with additive trade costs ("shipping the good apples out"). More recently, Hummels and Skiba (2004) found strong empirical support for the Alchian-Allen hypothesis using data on freight costs. However, the authors could not identify the magnitude of additive costs, as we do here. Furthermore, our methodology identifies all kinds of trade costs, whereas their paper was concerned with shipping costs exclusively. Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) , building on the model in this paper, examine Chinese exports and productivity growth before and after the elimination of externally imposed export quotas. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) use a model with heterogeneous firms and local additive distribution costs to analyze pricing to market and the reaction of exporters to exchange rate changes. They show that in response to currency depreciation, high-productivity firms optimally raise their markup rather than the volume, while low-productivity firms choose the opposite strategy.
Finally, our work connects to the literature that quantifies trade costs by fitting models to cross-country trade data. 6 Our approach of using the within-market relationship between 5 For example, the ratio of consumer prices for two varieties exported to the same market is (τp (ω 1 ) + t) / (τp (ω 2 ) + t), where τ is the multiplicative barrier, t is the additive barrier, andp (ω r ) is the producer price of variety ω r , r = 1, 2. The ratio equals relative producer pricesp (ω 1 ) /p (ω 2 ) if t = 0.
6 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide an overview of the literature. Recent contributions include Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Head and Ries (2001) , Helpman et al. (2008) , Hummels (2007) , and Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008). producer prices and exports is conceptually different and fully exploits the recent availability of detailed firm-level data. Furthermore, whereas the traditional approach can only identify iceberg trade costs relative to some benchmark, usually domestic trade costs, our method identifies the absolute level of (additive) trade costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the general framework and summarizes its implications. Since the subsequent empirical framework is formulated conditional on a set of general equilibrium variables, we do not specify a full model here, only the elements that are relevant to the empirical work. In section III, we describe the data and present some empirical patterns that are suggestive of the presence of additive trade costs. Section IV lays out the econometric strategy and presents the baseline estimates, as well as validation exercises and robustness checks. In section V, we present a full general equilibrium model. Section VI compares the welfare and trade flows impact of additive versus ad valorem tariffs. Finally, section VII concludes.
II. Basic Framework
In this section, we present a simple framework that features both iceberg and additive trade costs. The framework relies on minimal assumptions and allows us to derive two propositions. The first proposition provides the backbone for the identification of additive trade costs. The second shows why additive trade costs can be more detrimental to welfare and trade flows than multiplicative costs. Later, we present the full model, solve for the general equilibrium, and quantify the impact of additive trade costs on welfare and trade flows.
A. Consumer Demand
We consider a world economy comprising N countries. Each country n is populated by a measure L n of workers. The economy consists of a differentiated goods sector and a transport services sector. We describe the latter in detail in section VA and focus here on the differentiated goods sector.
Preferences across varieties of the differentiated product have the standard CES form with an elasticity of substitution σ > 1. Each variety enters the utility function with its own exogenous country-specific weight η n . These weights represent firm-and destination-specific demand shocks. These preferences generate a demand function A n ( p n /η n ) 1−σ in country n for a variety with price p n and demand shock η n . The demand level A n ≡ Y n P σ−1 n depends on total expenditure Y n and the consumption-based price index P n . 7
B. Additive and Multiplicative Trade Costs
As in Hummels and Skiba (2004) , the consumer price of a good depends on its producer price,p, as well as on additive and multiplicative trade costs, t ≥ 0 and τ ≥ 1, respectively:
Hence, total trade costs are partly proportional to the quantity shipped and partly proportional to the producer price. 8
Trade costs and demand elasticities. The identification strategy we employ in section IV focuses on the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the producer price. The following proposition shows that such an elasticity contains information about the size of additive trade costs, relative to the producer price and augmented by the iceberg cost; t/ (τp): Proposition 1. When t = 0, the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the producer price (E) , is equal to −σ. When t > 0, E = −σ/ 1 + t/ (τp) , and the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs t is (a) negative and (b) strictly increasing in the producer pricep.
We provide the proof of proposition 1 in the appendix and some intuition here. Using the chain rule, E is the product of (a) the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the consumer price and (b) the elasticity of the consumer price with respect to the producer price. In the (widely used) case of CES preferences, the first elasticity equals −σ, the (negative of the) elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The second elasticity, as equation (1) shows, depends on the magnitude of additive trade costs relative to the producer price and the iceberg cost. Additive trade costs act as a wedge between the consumer price and the producer price, and therefore between demand and the producer price. This dampening effect of additive trade costs is stronger for low producer prices. 9 In the online appendix, we discuss proposition 1 under different demand systems and show that the main content of the proposition continues to hold in a large class of demand systems. In section IVB we discuss our identification strategy and provide a graphical representation of the content of proposition 1.
Additive trade costs as wedges between prices. Consider two varieties. Variety 1 has producer pricep and consumer price p . Variety 2 is more expensive, with producer pricep = νp (ν > 1) and consumer price p. Both varieties are exported to the same market and are subject to the same additive trade cost t and multiplicative trade cost τ according to equation (1). Let χ = ( p/p )/(p/p ) be the wedge between the relative consumer ( p/p ) and producer price (p/p ) of the high price variety.
Proposition 2. When t
8 In the estimation of section IV, we always condition on the observed producer (f.o.b.) pricep so that at this stage, there is no need to make any assumption about market structure. 9 To help forming the intuition, consider the limiting case in which the producer price is so high that additive trade costs become negligible: changes in the additive trade cost have zero impact on E.
The relative consumer price of the high-cost variety in the importing country is the same as in the source country in the absence of additive trade costs. It is lower when trade costs are additive:
The wedge between the relative consumer and producer price depends on the magnitude of the additive trade cost. Holding producer prices constant,
since ν > 1. An increase in t reduces the relative consumer price of the high price variety. Note that in the absence of additive trade costs, an increase in multiplicative trade costs does not affect χ, which remains equal to 1. The additional price wedge associated with additive trade costs is the reason that gains from trade may differ in a model with additive trade costs compared to a model with multiplicative trade costs (section VI). The last part of proposition 2 shows that the impact of additive trade costs on χ is stronger the higher the degree of heterogeneity in producer prices, that is, the higher is ν,
We explore this intuition more formally in section VI. Note that proposition 2 is entirely independent of our assumption of CES preferences and relies just on equation (1). Under some regularity conditions about demand (see Hummels & Skiba, 2004) , an increase in t raises relative consumption of the high-price variety relative to the low-price variety. This is the well-known Alchian-Allen effect (Alchian & Allen, 1964) .
III. Empirical Regularities
In this section, we present the data set used and some empirical patterns that are suggestive of the presence of additive trade costs. In the next section, we move on to estimating additive trade costs formally.
A. Data
The data cover all Norwegian nonoil exporters in 2004 and originate from customs declarations. Every export observation is associated with a firm r, a destination n, a product k,
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the quantity transacted x knr , and the total f.o.b. value. 10 We calculate f.o.b. prices p knr by dividing total value by quantity. We define a product as a Harmonized System eight-digit (HS8) nomenclature category. The sample covers 17, 480 firms, exporting 5, 391 products to 203 destinations.
In 2004, total exports amount to NOK 232 billion (about US$34.4 billion), or 48% of the aggregate-including both exporters and nonexporters-manufacturing revenue. On average, each firm exported 5.6 products to 3.4 destinations for NOK 13.3 million (about US$2.0 million). On average, there are 3.0 firms per product-destination pair, with a standard deviation of 7.8. As we will see in section IV, our quantitative framework utilizes the relationship between f.o.b. price and export quantity across firms within a productdestination pair. In the formal econometric model, we choose to restrict the sample to product-destinations where more than 40 firms are present. Extreme values of quantity sold, defined as values below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for every product-destination, are dropped from the sample. All in all, this brings down the total number of products to 121 and the number of destinations to 21. Exports to all possible combinations of these products and destinations amount to 26.2% of total exports. In the robustness section, we consider an alternative sample that covers about 58.9% of total exports.
Several features of the Norwegian data are consistent with those from other countries. For example, Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013) report that firm-level facts for Norwegian exporters are consistent with those for French exporters shown in Eaton et al. (2011) .
B. Suggestive Evidence
Proposition 1 shows that the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs is negative and increasing in the producer price. In the following exercise, we provide evidence that these implications hold in the data, using distance between Norway and the destination country as a proxy for additive trade costs. We regress export volume (x knr ) on a full set of interactions between f.o.b. price ( p knr ), distance (Dist n ), and a dummy equal to 1 if the price is above the product-destination median price,
where × denotes the full set of interactions and β is the vector of coefficients. We also include product-destination fixed effects (α kn ) to exploit variation across firms within a productdestination cell, as suggested by the theory. The relationship between quantity exported and f.o.b. price is
The unit of measurement depends on the characteristics of the product (e.g., gloves and skis are measured in pairs and mineral water in liters). Firmproduct-destination-year observations are recorded in the data as long as the f.o.b. exports value is NOK 1,000 (approximately US$ 148) or higher. The dependent variable is log exports volume. Only product-destinations with more than ten firms are included in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by product-destination in column 1. Significant at ***1%, **5%.
which is allowed to vary between low-and high-price firms (β 3 ) and to depend on distance from Norway, with the slope being different for low-price (β 2 ) and high-price firms (β 2 +β 4 ). We expect to find a positive coefficient for β 2 , showing that distance increases the negative elasticity of demand (i.e., that the elasticity approaches 0). We also expect to find a negative coefficient for β 4 , showing that the dampening effect of additive trade costs is smaller for high-price firms.
Since the error ε knr is presumably correlated with prices, the estimated coefficients will not reflect the true demand elasticity. For example, if unobserved quality is a concern, we would expect the OLS estimator for β 1 to be biased toward 0. In the formal econometric model in section IV, we show that identification of additive trade costs does not rely on identifying the true demand elasticity. Nevertheless, we also create an instrument for prices. In the spirit of Hausman (1996) , we use the average price in other markets,
where N kr is the number of export destinations by firm-product kr and S − knr is the set of destinations served by firm-product kr, except destination n. We expect the price in other markets to be strongly correlated with the price charged in destination n while not directly affecting demand in market n. In other words, we assume that prices are correlated due to cost shocks, not demand shocks. Since the interaction terms are presumably also endogenous, we construct instruments for them as well (e.g., ln p knr ln Dist n is instrumented by ln z knr ln Dist n ).
Results from the estimations are presented in table 1. Column 1 is estimated with ordinary least squares, while in column 2, we instrument prices with prices in other markets. As expected, the IV estimate for β 1 is larger in absolute value than the OLS estimate. 11 Our results strongly support the theoretical implications of proposition 1: the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs (proxied by distance) is negative and increasing in the producer pricespecifically,
The magnitudes of the previous expressions can be easily computed and their signs can be checked using the coefficients in table 1 and knowing that average (log) distance between Norway and foreign destinations is about 7.6 (about 2,000 km). Using OLS estimates (table 1, column 1), the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs is about −0.04 for low-price firms and 0 for high-price firms. Using IV estimates (table 1, column 2), the corresponding values are even larger in absolute value, being −0.37 for low-price firms and −0.25 for high-price firms.
IV. Estimating Trade Costs
In this section we structurally estimate the magnitude of trade costs for every destination and every product in our sample. Proposition 1 shows that the elasticity of demand with respect to the producer price contains information on additive trade costs. It is this mechanism that provides identification and allows us to recover estimates of trade costs consistent with our model. The methodology is reminiscent of a triple difference approach, where trade costs are identified by comparing the difference in the elasticity of the volume of exports to f.o.b. prices between low-and high-price firms, for a particular product, across destinations. 12 The econometric strategy consists of finding the expected export volume conditional on the producer price charged by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using nonlinear least squares. 13 This strategy has at least three merits. First, we do not need to simulate a full general equilibrium to estimate trade costs. Second, we do not need assumptions about market structure or the firm productivity distribution, as we condition on observed f.o.b. prices. Third, since firm-level trade data by product and destination are now widely available, our methodology can be applied to a range of different countries and time periods.
A. Estimation
We employ a simple nonlinear least squares estimator where the objective is to minimize the squared difference between expected and actual log exports volume. The starting point is the quantity-demanded equation
In a previous version of this paper (Irarrazabal et al., 2010) , we identified additive trade costs from the exports volume distribution alone, without using information on prices. Even though the identifying assumption was very different from that used in this version of the paper, the previous methodology produced remarkably similar results. 13 We choose to use data for exports volume (quantities) instead of export sales for the following reasons. First, using quantities instead of sales minimizes measurement error due to imperfect imputation of transport/insurance costs. Second, we avoid transfer pricing issues when trade is intrafirm (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006) . Third, we do not get closed-form expressions for the estimation equation when using sales value. of section IIA. First, since we have data on quantities and prices for each firm-product-destination triplet, we add subscripts k (product) and r (firm) to the consumer price p and quantity x. Second, we allow the intercept term A to be product-destination-specific and the elasticity of substitution σ to be product-specific. We also allow the firm-productdestination-specific demand shock ln η knr to be correlated with the corresponding consumer price ln p knr (see section IVC). All in all, these changes imply the following equation,
where the demand shifter a kn = ln A kn = ln Y kn + (σ k − 1) ln P kn captures total expenditure and the price index of product k in market n. The consumer price p knr is unobserved, but the f.o.b. price p knr is observable in our data. We substitute p knr with p knr using p knr = τ kn p knr +t kn . The resulting estimating equation is
where t kn ≡ t kn /τ kn is our coefficient of interest, ≡ (σ k − 1) ln η knr , and the intercept termã kn ≡ a kn − σ k ln τ kn .
Finally, we decompose t kn into product-and destinationspecific fixed effects, t kn =t ktn and normalizet k = 1 for k = 1. The normalization is similar to the one adopted in the estimation of two-way fixed effects in the employeremployee literature (Abowd, Creecy, & Kramarz, 2002) . Althought k is estimated relative to some normalization, the estimate of t kn is invariant to the choice of normalization. 14 This decomposition enables us to identify trade costs that are due to product and market characteristics separately. We also decomposeã kn =ã kãn and normalizeã k = 1 for k = 1. This restriction helps us keep down the number of coefficients to estimate. Finally, we minimize, with respect to the coefficient vector
where K is the set of products in the sample, N k is the set of active destinations for product k, and R kn is the set of firms exporting product k to destination n. 15 14 We also need to ensure that all products and destinations belong to the same mobility group. The intuition is that if a market is served by only one product, then one cannot separate the product from the destination effect. In the robustness section, in section IVE, we check whether our estimates are sensitive to the trade cost decomposition t kn = t ktn by estimating t kn directly for all possible product-destination pairs. 15 In practice, we minimize O(.) under a set of lower and upper bounds and linear inequalities, since this speeds up the search for the global minimum. The lower and upper bounds are [−20, 20] for lnt k , lnt n , σ k ,ã k ,ã n ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N k , while the linear inequalities are lnt k + lnt n < 2 ln p kn ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N k , where p kn is the median producer price in product-destination kn. 
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B. Identification of Trade Costs
We discuss identification in the context of an example. Consider two products, feather (F) and stone (S), exported from Norway to Sweden (SE) and Japan (JP). Suppose the additive trade cost is larger for stone (than for feather) and for Japan (than for Sweden). That would likely be the case for transportation costs since stone is heavier than feather and Japan is more distant than Sweden from Norway. Figure  1 shows f.o.b. prices on the horizontal axis and quantity demanded for a simple numerical example (σ k = 1,t JP /t SE = 10,t S /t F = 5). Additive trade costs are minimal in the case of feather shipped to Sweden. Figure 1 shows that the quantitydemanded function in this case is almost linear, consistent with proposition 1. As we move from Sweden to Japan, the quantity-demanded function becomes more concave for low f.o.b. prices and does not change much for high f.o.b. prices. This is again consistent with proposition 1; the increase in the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the f.o.b. price, E, in response to an increase in additive trade costs (from Sweden to Japan), is larger for low-price compared to high-price firms.
The trade cost product and destination fixed effects,t k andt n , are identified by comparing differences in the slopes of the quantity-demanded function for low-price versus high-price firms across products for a given destination or across destinations for a given product. The methodology is therefore reminiscent of a triple difference approach, where trade costs are identified from the change in the difference in elasticities between low-and high-price firms, as we compare different markets. Note that a number of features of the data allow us to identify the slope coefficients σ k separately from the trade cost coefficientst kn . High-cost varieties (high p knr ) or varieties sold to "close" countries (e.g., Sweden) are associated with negligible trade costs coefficientst kn thereby making the slope, in equation (3), entirely dependent on σ k .
A potential concern is that our model assumes that the demand elasticity with respect to the consumer price is constant, while this may not be true in the data. In terms of figure 1, this means that the demand schedule for Sweden and feather might not be linear, even in the absence of additive trade costs. We discuss this case in the online appendix and show that proposition 1 and the identification strategy would still hold in this case.
Finally, we offer a comment about the interpretation of the results. Our methodology only allows identification of t kn ≡ t kn /τ kn . When commenting on the magnitude of additive trade costs in section IVD, we divide the estimates of t kn by the observed median f.o.b. price in product-destination kn: TC kn = (t kn /τ kn ) / p kn . In other words, we measure additive trade costs relative to the f.o.b. price multiplied by the iceberg cost. As a consequence, our estimates of additive trade costs would be higher if we had information about τ kn and were to report t kn / p kn .
C. Discussion
In this section, we address a number of potential concerns with our empirical framework.
Endogeneity.
A potential issue is that prices and quantities are determined simultaneously, so that the error term is correlated with the explanatory variables. Our estimator for t kn is, however, robust to supply-side mechanisms that make p knr endogenous. For example, assume that firms facing favorable demand shocks knr also charge higher prices, for example, knr = ζ k ln p knr + v knr where v knr is an i.i.d. error term. In that case, the estimating equation would be similar to equation (3), the only difference being the interpretation of the slope parameter, which would take the form σ k +ζ k . Therefore, even though the interpretation of the slope parameter would change, the estimate of t kn would not. In general, the slope coefficient σ k is a mixture of various structural supply-and demand-side parameters and any particular element is not separately identified (e.g., the elasticity of substitution). Identification of the trade cost coefficient is instead based on systematic nonlinear deviations from this equilibrium relationship between price and quantity.
Quality heterogeneity within and across markets. A related concern is that unobserved quality could be correlated with f.o.b. prices. As long as unobserved quality can be written as a linear function of the (log) price, we would get biased slope coefficients σ k , whereas the estimates of trade costs would remain unchanged. Hence, our methodology is robust to unobserved quality heterogeneity within HS-8 product categories. Furthermore, a model with firms varying their level of quality across markets for a given product, perhaps due to country income differences such as in Verhoogen (2008) , would not affect the estimate of trade costs. In our framework, quality differences across markets would be captured by the constant termã kn in the demand equation (3).
Selection bias. Firms are not randomly entering into different product-destinations, and this can create a correlation between prices and the error term. We hypothesize that the correlation is positive, since firms with both adverse demand shocks and high prices are less likely to be exporting. Analogous to the case with endogenous prices, such a selection effect would affect only the slope parameters, not the estimates of trade costs. (See section A.4 in the online appendix for further details.)
A different selection issue is that product-destination pairs characterized by high additive trade costs might not be active at all and therefore not appear in our data. Indeed, one of the implications of additive trade costs, which we illustrate in section V, is that even the most productive firm receives finite revenues that may not be sufficient to cover the entry cost in a given export market. 16 Hence, we are only able to 16 Selection into exporting can cause the trade cost elasticity to vary in response to changes in trade costs. Melitz and Redding (2013) show that the endogenous entry and exit decisions of firms into and out of the domestic The mean, median, and standard deviation of trade cost estimates are computed only over productdestination pairs where the f.o.b. price is nonmissing. The weighted average is computed using exports' value weights.
identify trade costs of traded goods, in contrast to all potentially tradable goods. This is an inherent constraint with our methodology, and we emphasize that average trade costs for all goods, including nontraded goods, might be even higher than the ones we uncover here.
Interpretation. We emphasize that although t kn is, by definition, constant across firms within an HS-8 product category (e.g., same $20 trade cost for all pairs of shoes exported to the United States), our framework allows for total trade costs that vary across firms within a product-destination pair. Iceberg costs, τ kn , are controlled for because they are subsumed into the intercept termsã kn . Hence, any mechanism that would make t kn vary systematically with product value would be subsumed into these terms. This shows that the t kn that we identify is, by definition, the cost that is constant across all firms within a product-destination pair.
D. Results
Given the estimates oft n andt k , we calculate trade costs relative to f.o.b. prices, TC kn = t kn / p kn , where p kn is the median f.o.b. price in product-destination pair kn. We report various moments of TC kn in table 2. 17 The unweighted mean of TC kn , averaged over all products and destinations, is 0.14. The weighted mean and median are smaller, suggesting that product-destination pairs with low trade costs have higher export volumes. As expected, trade costs are heterogeneous: the standard deviation of TC kn is 0.20, while the 75/25 percentile ratio is 9.59.
Of thet n andt k coefficients (the destination and product fixed effects), respectively, 95% and 98% are significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 18 This suggests that for the large majority of product-destination pairs, the null hypothesis of zero additive trade costs (i.e., a model with iceberg and export market provide a new channel for welfare gains that is absent from models without firm heterogeneity. 17 A few point estimates are in the far left and right tail of the distribution, and they tend to disproportionally affect the means. We therefore truncate our point estimates to values within the 5th to 95th percentile of the distribution. 18 Ast n andt k are estimated in logs, the null hypotheses are lnt k = ln ε − lnt n and lnt n = ln ε−lnt k , where ε = 1 is an arbitrary small amount of trade costs, in NOK, and lnt n and lnt k are the average of the log fixed effects. The alternative hypotheses are lnt k > ln ε − lnt n and lnt n > ln ε − lnt k . 19 Although the magnitude of the average TC kn is relatively small, the economic consequences of those costs are potentially large. We investigate the welfare effects of our estimates in section VI.
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The left graph in figure 2 shows the kernel density of trade costs across products in a given destination, TC kn . We focus on Sweden as the destination market, n = SE, because it is the country with the highest number of products exported (i.e., we maximize the number of observations in the TC kn density). The distribution is right-skewed, so that the mass of the distribution is concentrated close to 0, while a small number of products are in the right tail. The right graph in figure 2 shows the kernel density of the slope coefficients σ k . 20 For most products, σ k is negative, meaning that higher prices translate into lower sales volumes.
In figure 3 , we plot actual export volumes and prices (ln x knr and p knr ), as well as the conditional expectation of export volumes for a few product-destination pairs. We have chosen all export destinations for product HS 73269000, one of the top 19 We also test the hypothesis that all t kn = 0 formally. Let n T be the number of observations, Ψ res the vector of restricted coefficients (all t kn = 0), and Ψ unres the vector of unrestricted coefficients. Then the likelihood ratio statistic, 2n
, is χ 2 (r) distributed under the null, where r is the K + N − 1 restrictions. The null is rejected at any conventional p-value. 20 To improve readability, values below or above the 5th/95th percentile are dropped from the kernel densities. products in terms of export value. 21 The solid markers represent the conditional expectation, whereas x markers represent the data. F.o.b. prices are on the horizontal axis and export volumes on the vertical axis (in logs). We observe that the model is able to capture a substantial share of the variation in the data. Overall, across all product-destination pairs, we obtain an R 2 of 0.42. In the next section, we present the results of a number of exercises aimed at validating our estimates. We also provide a number of robustness checks.
E. Validation and Robustness
Validation. In this section, we perform a first validation of our empirical results by correlating the destination component of our trade cost estimates,t n , with distance between Norway and the destination countries; we also correlate our overall trade cost measure, TC kn , with the actual product weight per unit of value. We expect, in both cases, a positive relationship: transportation costs are increasing in both distance and weight (Hummels & Skiba, 2004) , and transportation costs are largely additive. 22 Figure 4 shows our estimates oft n , for every destination, on the vertical axis against distance on the horizontal axis. Both variables are expressed in logarithmic terms. Estimated trade costs are increasing in actual trade costs, as proxied by distance. Note that our two-way fixed-effects approach implies thatt n does not depend on the set of products actually exported to n. This implies that there is no selection bias in figure 4 (e.g., that low t kn products are sold in one destination and high t kn products in another destination). According to our estimates, trade costs to the United States are about 90% higher than trade costs to the Netherlands. The robust relationship between distance and trade costs also emerges when regressing estimated trade costst n on a set of gravity variables (distance, GDP, and GDP per capita, all in logs). The distance elasticity is then 0.23 (SE 0.10). 23 Figure 5 shows the relationship between TC kn and actual average weight/value across products. Both variables are expressed in logarithmic terms. 24 Since heavier and bulkier goods are more expensive to ship, we expect a positive 23 The GDP and GDP/capita elasticities are not significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. The full set of results is available on request.
24 Average weight/value is obtained by dividing total weight (summed over firms) over total value (summed over firms) in Sweden. We condition on Sweden to minimize selection effects and maximize the number of products with nonmissing values. Estimated trade costs per product are simply TC kSE . relationship between weight/value and estimated trade costs. Indeed, the scatter plot shows an upward-sloping relationship, with a correlation of 0.32 ( p-value 0.002). Most of the estimates in the product dimension also make intuitive sense. For example, aluminum profiles (HS 76042900) are among the products with estimated TC kn above the 95th percentile. Lightweight computer equipment (HS 84713000) is among the products with estimated TC kn below the 5th percentile. 25 Robustness. In table 3 we present some reestimations of the model that address several issues. First, we check whether our estimates are sensitive to the trade cost decomposition t kn =t ktn by estimating t kn directly for all possible productdestination pairs. As there are no longer any interlinkages among different products, we minimize the objective function product by product, that is, we estimate equation (3) separately for each product in our data. 26 As shown in column R1, the results are relatively close to the baseline case.
25 HS 76042900 = "Bars, rods and solid profiles, of aluminium alloys"; HS 84713000 = "Data-processing machines, automatic, digital, portable, weighing <= 10 kg, consisting of at least a central processing unit, a keyboard and a display." 26 The main disadvantage of this approach is that estimates of the trade costs per country are partly driven by selection of different products to different markets. We also investigate whether the choice of truncating the data set to product-destinations with more than 40 firms affects the results (column R2). We choose productdestinations with more than 20 firms, resulting in 33 destinations and 378 products. Exports to all possible combinations of these products and destinations amount to 58.9% of total export value. The increase in product-destination pairs makes joint estimation computationally infeasible, so we proceed by estimating product by product, as above. Both mean and median estimated trade costs are now somewhat higher. This suggests that trade costs for product-destination pairs with few exporters (between 20 and 40) are higher than for product-destinations with many exporters (more than 40).
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A Monte Carlo Experiment. We evaluate the precision of our estimates using a Monte Carlo simulation. We simulate the full general equilibrium model, presented in section V, to generate 150 data sets of f.o.b. prices and quantities for a few destinations and products, and estimate additive trade costs using the methodology from section IVA. Our methodology recovers the true value of additive trade costs with reasonable precision.
We start by drawing i.i.d. log-normally distributed demand shocks knr for 5,000 simulated firms, three destinations, and two products. Next, for each product and destination, we choose arbitrary values of t kn and τ kn . The remaining parameters used in the simulation are shown in table 4 and in section A.3 of the online appendix. For a given product, we solve the model according to the steps shown in section A.2 of the online appendix and obtain export prices and quantities exported in all three destinations. 27 Given the equilibrium export prices, we calculate trade costs TC kn = (t kn /τ kn ) / p kn . Table 4 shows that TC kn varies between 0.07 and 0.30 across markets and products.
We repeat this process 150 times, generating 150 simulated data sets. We then estimate the reduced-form model of equation (3) for each simulated data set. The estimation is based on the product-by-product strategy as described in section IVE.
The results are shown in the lower part of table 4. The averages of the estimated TC kn and σ k are fairly close to the true values across both destinations and products. The values 27 Hence, we solve two parallel models-one for each product. in parentheses are the standard deviations of the estimates, showing that the standard errors are acceptable even in this artificial sample with relatively few product-destination pairs.
Measurement error. As is well known for linear models, measurement error in the independent variable generates attenuation bias, where the magnitude of the bias is the variance of the true independent variable relative to variance of the noisy version of the independent variable. Because no such simple formula exists in the nonlinear case, we quantify the importance of attenuation bias using an extension of the Monte Carlo simulation above. 28 Understanding the role of measurement error may be particularly relevant in our context because the observed f.o.b. price,p knr , is calculated as the ratio of reported value to quantity (a unit value). There is potentially measurement error in both variables. We proceed by repeating the simulation above and then replacingp knr withp knr ψ knr in the estimation, where ψ knr is the measurement error. We assume that ln ψ knr is i.i.d. normal and set the standard deviation of the measurement error to 10% relative to the standard deviation of true pricesp knr . The Monte Carlo results are shown in table 5. The measurement error generates fairly strong attenuation bias compared to the true values reported in table 4. This suggests that our baseline estimates can be thought of as a lower bound if measurement error is significant in the data.
V. Back to Theory: General Equilibrium
So far we have estimated trade costs from a parsimonious framework that highlights the relationship between sales and producer prices, with sparse assumptions about 788 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS market structure and technologies and without needing to solve for the general equilibrium. This section completes the presentation of the model. Our model builds on Melitz (2003) , Chaney (2008) , and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) , but it features both iceberg and additive variable trade costs. The model features a differentiated goods sector and a transport sector. The wage is exogenously pinned down in the transport sector, and we solve for the price index in the differentiated goods sector. This is a necessary tool to evaluate gains from trade in a world with both additive and multiplicative trade costs and to quantify the importance of additive trade costs in shaping aggregate trade flows (section VI).
A. Additive Trade Costs
To introduce additive trade costs in the simplest way, we assume that the economic environment includes a transport sector whose services are used as an intermediate input in final goods production. Before going into the specifics, two remarks are necessary. First, our interpretation of additive trade costs is much broader than transport costs, but we adopt this modeling terminology for simplicity. Second, the way we introduce additive costs in the model is, in practical terms, very similar to the widely used assumption of a frictionless homogeneous good sector.
Transport services are freely traded and produced under constant returns to scale. ϕ m T in units of labor are necessary for transferring one unit of a good from a plant in i to its final destination in n, using shipping services from country m. The sector is perfectly competitive, so there is a global shipping service price w m ϕ m T in for each route, where w m is the wage in country m. Relative wages between any two countries i and n are then pinned down in all markets as long as each country produces the shipping service and are equal to w i /w n = ϕ n /ϕ i . By normalizing the price on a particular shipping route to 1, say, from i to n, all nominal wages are pinned down. The additive trade cost is then defined as t in ≡ w l ϕ l T in = w m ϕ m T in , ∀ l, m (i.e., same cost irrespective of the nationality of the shipping supplier).
B. Prices
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of both their technology, associated with productivity z, and their set of destination-specific demand shocks {η n } n=1,...,N . 29 A firm in country i can access market n only after paying a destinationspecific fixed cost f in , in units of the numéraire. Given labor costs w i and the variable trade costs t in and τ in , profits are
in is the quantity demanded. 30 Given a monopolistically competitive market structure and preferences, a firm with efficiency z maximizes profits by setting its consumer price as a constant markup over total marginal production cost:
Exploiting the relationship between consumer prices, p in , and producer (f.o.b.) prices,p in ,
the producer price can be written as
Note that the markup over production costs is no longer constant. All else equal, a more efficient firm will charge a higher markup, since the perceived elasticity of demand that such a firm faces is lower. In other words, the markup is higher for more efficient firms since, due to the presence of additive trade costs, a larger share of the consumer price does not depend on the producer price.
C. Entry and Cutoffs
As in Chaney (2008) , the total mass of potential entrants in country i is κw i L i , where κ > 0 is a proportionality constant, so that larger and wealthier countries have more entrants. Without a free entry condition, firms generate net profits that have to be redistributed. We assume that each consumer owns w i shares of a totally diversified global fund and that profits are redistributed to them in units of the numéraire good. The total income Y i spent by workers in country i is the sum of their labor income w i L i and of the dividends they earn from their portfolio w i L i π, where π is the dividend per share of the global mutual fund.
Firms will enter market n only if they can earn positive profits there. Some low-productivity firms may not generate sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs. We define the productivity thresholdz in (η n ) from π in (z in , η n ) = 0 as the lowest possible productivity level consistent with nonnegative profits in export markets,
In the presence of additive trade costs, even the most productive firm receives finite revenues that may not be sufficient to cover the entry cost in market n. Therefore, the entry hurdle can be infinite, opening up the possibility of no trade flows between country-pairs. Note that unlike in Helpman et al. (2008) , zero trade flows will emerge without imposing an upper bound on productivity levels. Also unlike in Eaton et al. (2012) , zero trade flows will emerge without assuming a finite integer number of firms.
D. Price Levels
Productivity and demand shocks are drawn from distributions with densities f (z), and φ (η n ), respectively. The price index is then
We can summarize an equilibrium with the following set of equations:
The first equation states that the price index is a function of itself (sincez in is a function of P n ) and the dividend share π (sincez in is a function of Y n which is a function of π). The second equation states that the dividend share is a function of itself and all price indices. In section A.2 of the online appendix, we explain this further and show how to numerically solve for the general equilibrium.
VI. Welfare and Trade Costs
A. Welfare
This section explores the welfare consequences of imposing ad valorem versus additive trade barriers. The experiment is as follows. We ask the government to collect $X in import tariffs. The tariff can be imposed as a multiplicative import tariff (M) or as an additive tariff (A). 31 We measure the decline in welfare and trade in cases M and A. We find that 31 Section A.5 in the online appendix shows that a significant share of duties is non-ad valorem. the multiplicative tariff is less welfare dampening compared to the additive tariff. Our intuition is that in the presence of heterogeneous prices, an additive barrier acts as a wedge between the prices of any two imported goods (proposition 2). As a consequence, an additive barrier affects the relative consumption of different imported goods. Multiplicative trade barriers, on the other hand, only affect consumption of imports relative to domestic goods. This difference gives rise to different welfare effects in the additive and multiplicative cases.
There are two main reasons for our choice of the welfare criterion. First, exploring the consequences of equal-yield taxes has a long tradition in public economics. Suits and Musgrave (1953) solve a similar problem in a model with one monopolist. They also find that multiplicative taxes are welfare superior compared to additive ones. Our contribution compared to the existing literature is to show that this result extends to general equilibrium trade models and, further, that firm heterogeneity exacerbates the negative impact of an additive tariff (see below). Second, standard gains from trade comparisons between additive and multiplicative tariffs are inherently hard. Consider the following experiment. Calibrate an additive-only model (A) and a multiplicative-only model (M) to a specific import share I. Then take A and M to free trade. We can then compare the increase in real wages from A to free trade and from M to free trade. However, due to the additional wedges introduced by additive tariffs, the level of t that is needed to generate a specific I is much lower than the level of τ that is needed. As a consequence, the fall in t from (A) to free trade is much smaller than the fall in τ from (M) to free trade. Hence, this type of comparison is not ideal, as the fall in trade costs is not comparable across models. The equal-yield approach addresses this concern because the aggregate change in tariff revenue is held constant across models.
We simulate a baseline symmetric two-country version of the model presented above. The productivity distribution f (z) is Pareto with shape parameter γ, while demand shocks are constant across firms (η = 1). First, we choose values commonly used in the literature for key parameters of the model, such as the elasticity of substitution and the Pareto shape parameter (table 6). Trade costs in the baseline model are set equal to the estimated value of average trade costsT C from table 2. Given these parameter values, we simulate the baseline equilibrium. 32 Next, starting from the baseline equilibrium, an additive import tarifft is introduced (case A). 33 We choose at equal 32 We use the unweighted mean of TC kn = 0.14 and set τ n = 1 and domestic trade costs to zero. Recall that TC = (t/τ) / p, so in practice, we search for a t that yields t relative to median export prices ( p) equal to 0.14. Note that, as explained in section IVC, there is no clear relationship between the estimates of σ k in section IVD and the elasticity of substitution. We calibrate the elasticity of substitution σ to 4, the mean value in Broda and Weinstein (2006) . 33 Note thatt andτ denote tariffs, while t and τ denote transport services. Total additive trade costs are the sum of transport services and additive tariffs: t +t. a Real wage in baseline normalized to 100.τ in case M chosen so that tariff income is equal to case A. τ in alternative baseline chosen to match the import share in the baseline (22.6%). Parameter values used in the simulation: γ = 4 (Simonovska & Waugh, 2014) , σ = 4 (Broda & Weinstein, 2006, mean SITC 3-digit) . Calibrated parameters: fij is chosen to match the share of firms exporting in Norway (38%, Moxnes, 2010) , while fii = 0. Ten thousand draws were used in simulation.
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to 5% of the median export price (t/ p = 0.05). The tariff generates T A in government revenue,
where Q A is total quantity imported. 34 The alternative policy is to introduce a multiplicative tariffτ (case M). In this case, tariff revenue is
where I M is the total value of imports. 35 The premise for our analysis is that T M = T A . We therefore setτ so that (τ − 1) /τ =tQ A /I M is satisfied. Since our primary interest is the welfare decline in A relative to M, we do not consider how tariff income is spent; in other words, consumer income is fixed. 36 The resulting real wages and the import shares are shown in table 6. The additive barrier produces a welfare decline of 2.02% compared to a 1.31% decline in the equal-yield multiplicative case. The welfare decline is therefore around 50% greater in the additive case.
The fall in trade is also larger in the additive case. The import share declines from 22.6% to 17.7% in A and from 22.6% to 19.4% in M. This result suggests that inferring (iceberg) trade costs from trade flows using gravity models, as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , may overstate trade barriers, as additive costs dampen trade more than multiplicative costs do. It is well known that standard models have difficulties matching the growth in global trade over time (Yi, 2003) . Our results indicate that additive trade costs may play an important role. We leave these important questions for future research.
34 Q A = κwL 36 For example, assuming that tariff revenue is distributed lump sum to the final consumer would alter the absolute change in real wages from the baseline to A or M, but not the decline in A relative to M.
Firm heterogeneity. Next, we explore the role of firm heterogeneity. We choose a higher value of the Pareto coefficient γ, implying less firm heterogeneity, and recalculate the baseline equilibrium as well as A and M. In this case, M still welfare dominates A, but the difference is less pronounced. 37 This is consistent with proposition 2-that the additive wedge between two imported goods is smaller when prices across firms are more similar.
An alternative baseline. The baseline equilibrium used the estimated value ofT C = 0.14 under the assumption that trade costs are exclusively additive. Here, we instead assume that baseline trade costs are exclusively multiplicative. Specifically, we choose trade costs τ so that the import share is the same as in the previous baseline (22.6%, table 6). The last row in table 6 shows that this produces an iceberg cost of τ = 1.33. Interestingly, the real wage is identical to the baseline case. The iceberg-equivalent economy features the same import share but with significantly fewer exporters than the additive baseline (38.0 in the additive baseline compared to 22.8% in the multiplicative baseline). This occurs because additive costs reduce profits by less for small (and high price) firms compared to multiplicative costs. Hence, the additive baseline can sustain more (small) exporters than the alternative (multiplicative) baseline. We then calculate the changes in real wages when imposing at orτ. Our simulations show that multiplicative tariffs still welfare-dominate additive tariffs, and the magnitude of the welfare decline is relatively similar to the baseline case. 38
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new methodology for estimating trade costs. An important property of our framework, which provides the basis for identification, is that an increase in additive trade costs has a systematically different impact on the demand elasticity among low-price versus high-price firms. It is the marriage of additive costs and price heterogeneity, within narrowly defined industries, that drives the theoretical and empirical results in this paper.
We structurally estimate the magnitude of additive trade costs for every product and destination in our data set. Estimated additive trade costs are on average 14%, expressed relative to the median price. They are quite heterogeneous across product-destination pairs and, as expected, are highly correlated with distance and product weight/value ratios. We reject the null hypothesis of zero additive trade costs (a model with iceberg costs exclusively) for the large majority of product-destination pairs.
Using our microestimates, we show that both the welfare and the trade flows impact of additive trade barriers is much higher than the impact of multiplicative trade barriers. A reduction in additive trade barriers implies higher welfare gains and larger increases in trade flows than an equal yield reduction in multiplicative trade barriers. Furthermore, additive trade costs can help us understand the prevalence of zeros in bilateral trade flows. We conclude that empirical and theoretical work should account for both (the tip of the) iceberg costs, as well as the part of trade costs that are largely hidden under the surface: additive costs.
Our quantitative framework is potentially useful in a number of applications. Trade costs can easily be estimated for other countries and years, as firm-level trade data are now available for a number of developing and developed countries. For future work, our analysis points to the need for further research in understanding the time-series and geographic response of aggregate trade flows to additive trade costs.
